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For the last decade, the dramatic events in eastern and central Europe have 
(rightly) dominated the security debate in Europe and, indeed, the wider 
world. One of the consequences of this has been that the traditional neglect 
of the Mediterranean region has been compounded. However, there are now 
signs - notably the recent Barcelona conference at which the European 
Union's Mediterranean policy was relaunched and extended (to incorporate 
the grand design of a Mediterranean free trade area) - that the 
Mediterranean is, at last, receiving some of the attention it deserves and 
justifies. 
More specifically, Malta and Cyprus are due to begin accession 
negotiations with the EU six months after the end of the EU's 1996-97 
intergovernmental conference.' This will raise a number of important 
security issues which will have to be addressed. First of all, as regards 
Cyprus, the de facto division of the island- the 'Cyprus problem' -continues 
to determine further progress on its membership quest even though 
officially it has been claimed that the two problems have effectively been 
separated. Malta's main challenge lies in adapting its neutrality, enshrined 
in the Constitution, with the requirements of the EU's Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). These major problems apart, there are a number of 
broader issues related to these two small states' participation in a larger 
Union which need closer examination. For example, both states have in the 
past been active members of the non-aligned movement. Both worked 
closely within the neutral and non-aligned group in the heyday of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and would 
therefore not find it difficult to reactivate such collaboration with Austria, 
Ireland, Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, Cyprus and Malta enjoy special 
bilateral relations with two of the present EU and NATO member states: 
Cyprus with Greece, with which it has a defence agreement, and Malta with 
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Italy, which is the only country which offers Malta military guarantees of its 
neutrality. Moreover, Cyprus and Malta occupy a geostrategic position in 
the Mediterranean of some importance to the security of the European 
Union itself. 
A number of problems are related to their participation in the EU's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the first place, what shape 
is the CFSP likely to have in a European Union of more than twenty 
members? What are the security and foreign policy concerns which are 
likely to dominate the enlarged Union? What security and foreign policy 
concerns do Cyprus and Malta have, and how do they envisage addressing 
these by their participation in the process of European integration? A 
corollary question is whether the EU's and the applicants' security and 
foreign policy aims pull in the same direction. If they do, then membership 
has negligible political problems for the Union. If they do not, then it is 
important to examine what their likely impact on the Union will be. 
The Background: Malta and Cyprus's Relations with the European 
Union 
From the early 1960s, when the two island states first approached the 
European Community to establish a relationship with it, in the aftermath of 
the United Kingdom's first application to join the EU, security questions 
hardly featured at all, but economic ones did prominently, primarily the 
need to safeguard their fragile position in the UK market. Cyprus had just 
become independent and Malta was on the way to achieving its 
independence but still their state of economic dependence on the United 
Kingdom was virtually absolute. However, when they eventually signed 
association agreements with the EU in the early 1970s, the question of UK 
membership actually featured much less, if at all in the case of Malta.' Both 
countries sought closer ties with the EU as one of a number of factors in 
their overall economic development strategy, especially the need for greater 
market access and diversification, in the last analysis in an attempt to 
transform dependence into interdependence. To a large degree, both 
succeeded in achieving these aims. In the case of Malta, the impact on the 
flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth attributed to 
the association agreement have been well documented' As for Cyprus, the 
agreement did not have a similar impact in its first decade for several 
reasons, primarily the economic devastation caused by the Turkish invasion, 
the magnetic pull of the Middle Eastern markets following the first oil 
shock, the re-opening of the Suez Canal, and last, but not least, the Lebanese 
civil war which bestowed on Cyprus some of Lebanon's characteristics as 
the 'gateway to the Middle East'. However, when the Near East markets lost 
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their pull following the fall in oil prices in the mid- I 980s, Cyprus was 
compelled to shift its attentions westwards, and the EU-Cyprus Association 
Agreement became extremely useful.' 
Economic imperatives are still a major factor in the Maltese and Cypriot 
applications to join the EU. Their present association agreements have been 
devalued by certain developments, especially the EU's internal market 
programme, enlargement, the prospects of further enlargement, the 
proliferation of similar association agreements, and further trade 
liberalization as a result of the recent Uruguay Round. Their competitive 
edge in the EU is also eroded by the fact that structural funds flow to the 
Union's own Mediterranean backward regions, but not to them. These 
considerations alone make EU membership or, at the very least, 
participation in the EU's internal market extremely attractive to Cyprus and 
Malta. Furthermore, as outsiders with extensive links with the EU, they are 
constrained more and more to adapt most of the Union's legislation, or 
socio-economic structures, more so in the case of Cyprus which has a 
customs union agreement with the EU, without participating in its decision-
making process. Their membership bids are thus driven by economic 
considerations and, to that extent, political and security issues are 
secondary. 
However, there remain some serious political and security issues which 
have to be taken into account. First, there are 'general' issues common to 
both, such as the declining importance of non-alignment and neutrality in 
the post-Cold War era as well as growing instability in the Mediterranean 
region itself. Such problems are magnified when confronted by micro-
states, although the specific problem of non-alignment can actually be 
dismissed rather easily: the movement never guaranteed any real security to 
the two states but served them both to underline their freedom from 
superpower rivalry during the Cold War. It was clearly not a certificate of 
innocence in a world corrupted by superpower rivalry. Both island states 
sought to extract dividends by exploiting this rivalry: Cyprus tried to 
strengthen its hand in international diplomacy against Turkey over the 
'Cyprus Question' while Malta attempted to extract financial guarantees for 
its peculiarly defined 'neutrality based on non-alignment'. The end of the 
Cold War has pulled the rug from underneath the non-aligned movement 
and there are no more superpower rivalries to exploit. Hence, both Cyprus 
and Malta face no big problems in jettisoning non-alignment; in fact, it is 
the EU which sees non-alignment as problematical because of the 
difficulties that adhering to such a policy may imply for the CFSP. 
Nevertheless, even if this issue can be easily resolved, there remain others 
which will have to be clarified before the two applicants participate in the 
CFSP, in particular their approach to the general question of (in)stability in 
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the Mediterranean region and the question of Malta's neutrality and its 
compatibility with the CFSP, matters which cannot be dismissed easily. 
The Cyprus Question and Membership 
The treatment of the 'Cyprus problem' has gone through an interesting 
series of ups and downs in the European Union. The Commission had 
initially linked the issue of membership and the de facto division of the 
island closely in a document presented to the Lisbon Council in June 1992. 
Up to that point there appeared to have been a broad consensus on this 
issue.' This was the position subsequently reiterated in the Commission's 
Opinion on the application of Cyprus.' However, on the insistence of 
Greece; the European Council meeting in Corfu established that the next EU 
enlargement will involve Cyprus and Malta.' This part of the Corfu 
European Council Declaration was interpreted by Greece and Cyprus as 
having effectively separated the issue of Cypriot membership from the 
question of the prior resolution of the 'Cyprus problem' .10 However, it was 
not clear that this view was shared by the rest of the EU. It was not until 
Greece blocked further progress on the EO-Turkey Customs Union 
Agreement in 1995 that the rest of the Union apparently came round to this 
position when, in June 1995, the European Council meeting in Cannes 
reaffirmed that 'negotiations on the accession of Malta and Cyprus to the 
Union will begin on the basis of Commission proposals, six months after the 
conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and taking the 
outcome of that Conference into account'." That is where the legal position 
stands at present. 
In its international dealings, the (Greek) Cypriot government speaks for 
the whole of Cyprus including the north, even though it exercises no control 
over it. The EU has always accepted this and dealt with the authorities in 
Nicosia as representing the whole territory of the island. The Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is recognized only by Turkey. The 
European Court's July 1994 decision, whereby agricultural products from 
the TRNC were not to be allowed into the EU unless accompanied by the 
proper phytosanitary certificates issued by the competent Cypriot 
authorities," effectively makes the solution of the 'Cyprus problem' an 
internal Cypriot issue. 
However, the accession of Cyprus before a solution of the 'Cyprus 
problem' will in fact mean that only the southern, Greek Cypriot part will 
form part of the EU. The Turkish Cypriots have stated that if negotiations 
commence with Cyprus the northern part of Cyprus may become an 
autonomous region of Turkey. Indeed, Turkish Cypriot President Rauf 
Denktash has suggested that accession of the Greek Cyprus to the EU would 
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effectively solve the 'Cyprus problem' 'on the basis of two separate 
republics' and went on to describe such a move as 'Enosis1' through the 
EC' .14 However, an alternative scenario would be to draw a parallel with 
Germany, where the West was a member for many years before being joined 
by the East. Similarly for Cyprus, the south could join first and the Turkish 
North later. This comparison may be crude but it does suggest that a divided 
country may be able to join the EU without inflicting damage on itself or on 
the process of European integration. 
However, a better rationale for believing that the 'Cyprus problem' 
would not cause difficulties after the Cypriot accession can be put forward 
on the basis of three reasons: 
• The EU and its institutions will strenuously avoid direct involvement in 
internal Cypriot disputes. The past attitude of Brussels to events in 
Northern Ireland and, more specifically, in Cyprus itself strongly suggest 
this. 
• The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots do not want to renew 
hostilities as both sides perceive advantages in the present situation. 
Events in Nicosia in August 1996 indicate the depth of feeling in both 
Cypriot communities but there is very little support for a return to the 
excesses of the past. 15 
• In the wider context the Cypriot problem is loosing its importance as it 
becomes one of many potential and, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia in 
particular, actual flashpoints in the Mediterranean region. 
Clearly, these arguments presume the existence of a certain amount of 
rationality which has not always been apparent in Cyprus and the 'Cyprus 
problem' could escalate very quickly. However, this remains the least likely 
scenario. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the crisis in Cyprus caused by the Turkish 
invasion in 1974 was one of the first real tests of the EU's then newly 
established European Political Cooperation (EPC) procedure, of which the 
CFSP is a development. Initially, consultations proceeded quickly and 
efficiently and a common position was reached, in part because of the strong 
leadership of France which then held the Presidency of the Council. 
However, in the longer term, very little was achieved. 1' The root causes of 
this failure were the different views of EU member states and the 
unwillingness of those member states with potential influence to exert it. 
Ultimately, the EU adopted a neutral position, caught between a desire to 
support the newly democratic Greece and the need to avoid alienating 
Turkey, which played a vital role within NATO, and the 'common policy' 
was reduced to no more than the issuing of statements. 17 The EU was 
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equally powerless when the Turks intervened for a second time in August 
1974. Its policy then and since has essentially been to fall in line behind the 
Americans and the United Nations. 
The second reason, highlighted above, why a divided Cyprus may not 
necessarily hold back the Cypriot membership bid, was the apparent 
acceptance of the current de facto division of the island and disinclination 
to renew active hostilities. Since 1974 Greek Cypriots have rebuilt their 
economy on the basis of tourism, the influx of foreign banks, offshore 
companies, and world merchant marines. Renewed hostilities would 
undermine the confidence on which prosperity has been built and lead to 
another economic collapse. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots are seeking to 
promote economic development through tourism, albeit on a smaller scale, 
and Turkey itself is pursuing its interests elsewhere in the region and finds 
a peaceful Cyprus convenient. More generally, the Turkish Cypriots have a 
much valued sense of security and behind a Turkish military shield have 
established a comparatively comfortable milieu in which there is 
underemployment but little unemployment, adequate housing, medical and 
educational provision and much state feather bedding. There is thus little 
incentive to restart hostilities. As regards Cyprus, Turkey is a contented 
power. The 'Cyprus problem' has, as Cypriot President Clerides claimed in 
August 1995, settled into a stalemate." The proposal to start confidence-
building measures under UN auspices has not made any headway. Similarly, 
the Greek Cypriot proposal for a demilitarization of the island- involving 
a Turkish withdrawal and the dismantlement of the Greek Cypriot national 
guard- have been ignored by Turkey. Ex-Turkish Prime Minister <;iller had 
said that Turkey would be ready for a solution of the 'Cyprus problem' only 
after Turkey joins the EU. 
It might be expected that Cypriot EU membership would promote the 
continuation of this peaceful coexistence. However, an aggressively anti-
Turk or anti-Turkish Cypriot policy stance within the EU by the Greeks and 
the Greek Cypriots would endanger it, especially if Turkey had been further 
disenchanted by the Greek Cypriot accession. Much will depend on 
Greece's behaviour. Recent history suggests that Greece may use its 
advantage of EU membership to condition Turkey's behaviour. 
Accordingly, 'the road to normalization and eventual accession of Turkey to 
the EC passes through Athens ... Greece's conditionality policy seeks to 
increase the cost associated with some Turkish policies ... and to modify 
through indirect pressure, Turkey's behaviour on issues considered vital to 
Greece' .19 Alternatively, Greece could cultivate opportunities for 
reconciliation, paying special attention to the utility of confidence-building 
measures in Cyprus and the Aegean." For a while during 1995, Greece 
appeared to mellow only for relations with Turkey to worsen once again 
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over the Aegean; indeed, antagonism towards Turkey caused Greece to 
continue to block EU financial aid to the Mediterranean non-member 
countries under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Furthermore, recent 
Greek behaviour in the Balkans has been such that Greece was considered 
part of the Balkan problem and not its solution.'1 Mutual suspicion 
continues. For example, the Turkish view that the 'declared Greek 
Government policy [is] that they have to take up the protection of the 
Hellens abroad'" is matched by a Greek perception that 'Ankara's grand 
strategy aims at boosting the world role of Turkic and Islamic nations 
stretching from Central Asia to central Yugoslavia.'" 
Greece's pan-Hellenic policy has found its echo in Cyprus. In 1994 
Cyprus and Greece concluded a new defence pact which would lead in 
stages to the unification of the two countries' defence plans. Following a 
meeting in Athens between the Cyprus National Council and the Greek 
Government, the two sides promised close co-operation and a joint struggle 
'against all adversaries' .24 Cyprus has been engaged in a rearmament 
programme of its own, acquiring the French MM-40 surface-to-surface 
Exocet missile." The Greek defence minister, Geraasimos Arsenis, was 
reported to have said during a visit to Cyprus in July 1995, that 'the 
Common Defence dogma between Cyprus and Greece will be the magnet 
that will unite Hellenism and will not divide it. He stressed that the joint 
defence dogma is an integral aspect of Greece's defence strategy and thus 
when defence matters are discussed, that will inevitably be discussed too. 
The strengthening of Cyprus's defence is a necessary precondition for the 
security of the island.'" Taking advantage of NATO's ability to reduce 
conventional forces under the CFE Treaty by 'cascading' them into alliance 
partners, Greece and Turkey each received hundreds of tanks and other 
pieces of equipment mostly from the United States and Germany during 
1993. Turkey alone received 1,017 tanks and Greece accepted delivery of 
725 tanks. By the end of 1995, both countries were to achieve lower CFE 
ceilings" which means that most of the equipment received would be used 
to modernize the armed forces. Hence, while both sides may continue to 
exhibit restraint, the situation could easily explode. 
One important consideration is that many EU member states are 
increasingly becoming impatient with Greece's attitude in the Union and 
might not easily condone a Greek return to hostilities against Turkey. These 
same factors operate as well vis-ii-vis Cyprus which will find it difficult to 
use its EU membership to apply pressure on Turkey. This lack of patience 
with the Cypriots has become increasingly apparent generally. In late 1994, 
in the face of continued lack of progress towards a settlement in Cyprus, the 
UN Secretary-General raised the possibility of reallocating scarce UN 
resources to tackle disputes elsewhere." The frustration which this reflected 
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had been graphically stated much earlier by the Foreign Minister of one of 
the contributing countries to the peacekeeping operation (UNFICYP) in 
1992: 'I cannot explain to our tax payers that they are financing the peaceful 
development of the economy of Cyprus by paying for our troops there while 
the Cypriot leaders have the luxury to reject every settlement proposal they 
do not embrace one hundred per cent ... to hell with them.'" 
The Danes and the Canadians duly left UNFICYP in 1992 and 1993 
respectively (to be replaced eventually by the Argentineans) and this was 
followed by a temporary Russian veto on the UN element of the funding of 
the UNFICYP. Obviously, the interest and the patience of the international 
community is approaching its limits. This partly reflects the fact that the 
'Cyprus problem' is being pushed down the agenda by the (actual and 
potential) much more violent ethnic disputes elsewhere in the region or 
nearby, notably in ex-Yugoslavia. This growing concern with other parts of 
the region also influences Greek and Turkish policies and, therefore, 
increases the chances of continued peaceful coexistence of the two 
communities in Cyprus. Indeed, the Cyprus 'solution' has actually been put 
forward as a model for settling disputes elsewhere.30 Inversely, pacification 
in the Balkans and the reimposition of Russian control in Central Asia 
would have the opposite effects. 
Thus, while there would seem to be good reasons for supposing that a 
settlement of the 'Cyprus problem' is no longer a prerequisite for Cypriot 
membership of the EU, the forces which could make the Cypriot accession 
problematic may not be easily contained and may manifest themselves 
through other channels. Accession by Cyprus with the north joining later 
- on the German model - is a possibility and, indeed, (Greek) Cypriots 
argue that membership itself will have a positive effect on the solution of 
the 'Cyprus problem'. The demonstration effect of membership might 
convince Turkish Cypriots that some compromise on the 'Cyprus problem' 
is a price worth paying for the benefits of joining the EU. More important 
than this though, would be the Turkish reaction if the Greek Cypriots are 
allowed into the EU while Turkey and the TRNC are left out. This is 
because, although the division of Cyprus has commanded centre-stage in 
the debate over Cypriot accession to the EU, it is the impact which the 
Cypriot membership would have on Greece's relationship with its partners 
and, in particular, Turkey's relations with the EU, that is most important, 
particularly from a security perspective. Indeed, Turkey has already reacted 
very negatively to the way Greece has linked its customs union agreement 
to the fixing of a definite date for the start of negotiations with Cyprus and 
Malta. Moreover, the expressions of Turkish displeasure prompted, in turn, 
a predictably furious Greek response. 31 
The EU's relationship with Turkey has indeed been a troubled one. The 
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'Cyprus problem' has always been a factor, but the difficulties run much 
deeper. Turkey has pursued a European identity since the time of Atattirk 
and arguably even earlier and has always sought a close relationship of 
some kind with the EU. It has had an association agreement with the EU 
since 1963 and applied for membership in 1987, receiving a negative 
opinion in 1989." In its view the Commission singled out the 'Cyprus 
problem', various other political problems, the poor state of relations with 
Greece and the economic unpreparedness of Turkey to join the EU as the 
main reasons for not opening negotiations. In some quarters there are also 
religious and cultural concerns regarding Turkey eligibility for membership .. 
With hindsight, Turkey's greatest mistake was not applying at the same time 
as Greece had done in the late 1970s. This failure was due to domestic 
difficulties and the military coup of 1980 which did not permit an 
application to the EU until democracy was restored in Turkey." However, 
the one positive aspect relates to Turkey's strategic position and the pivotal 
role it plays in the western security system. This creates a dilemma for the 
European Union, as it feels a need to accommodate Turkey but is unwilling 
to offer full membership of the Union in the foreseeable future. 
During the Cold War, both due to its membership of NATO and its 
geostrategic position, Turkey had a key role 'as a pillar against the threat of 
Soviet expansion out of the Black Sea, and against that of Arab and Iranian 
turmoil in the Middle East.'" Bordering the USSR, Turkey constituted an 
essential part of the exposed south-eastern flank of NATO and therefore the 
EU had every reason to keep good relations with Turkey. Indeed EU 
relations with Turkey ebbed and flowed with the degree of perception of the 
Soviet threat. Thus following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the EU 
was ready to offer concessions and to try to rescue the association 
agreement. When the Cold War ended, Turkey's position became pivotal 
again as demonstrated during the Gulf crisis and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. In fact Turkey's strategic position has increased in importance as it 
is virtually surrounded by areas of high risk to western and world security: 
the Balkans, the Transcaucasian region of the former USSR, the former 
Soviet republics in Central Asia as well as the Near and Middle East, 
especially Iraq. Turkey is, in fact, at the centre of a crescent-shaped wedge 
of territory stretching from Kazakhstan to the Gulf and Suez and finally to 
the North African coast, containing the most volatile collection of states in 
the world. Turkey can play two roles: first, as a staging post for any future 
allied force required in the Middle East; secondly, as a model to other 
Islamic states in the region that they too can construct a secular, democratic 
and prosperous nation. If it is accepted that the whole focus of security 
concerns and of NATO has swung from East-West to North-South, then 
Turkey and the Mediterranean region are of critical importance." 
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Hence, it has become of utmost importance that Turkey be integrated 
with the West and therefore good relations between Greece and Turkey have 
become essential. Unfortunately, the Greco-Turkish relationship remains as 
volatile as ever, as witnessed by the events surrounding the conclusion of 
the customs union agreement with Turkey and recent developments in the 
Aegean; these were triggered by Greece's insistence on extending its 
territorial sea as part of a new Law of the Sea agreement signed by the EU, 
and flared up when Turkey threatened military force against a few islands 
in the region. Disputes in the Aegean involve not only the delimitation of 
the territorial sea but also the militarization of certain Aegean islands, 
delimitation of the continental shelf and airspace limits. 
The impact of Greek Cypriot accession may well be the final straw that 
drives the Turks to renewed, open conflict with Greece and the curtailment 
of its pro-European line. The pressure exerted by the Islamic party, now in 
government, make this more likely. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mutaz 
Soysal, had said, 'NATO is no more the backbone of Turkish policy ... our 
interest may not coincide point by point with our traditional allies.'" The 
message appears clear: Turkey should not be taken for granted any more. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the argument, because, 
realistically, Turkey's options are limited. Leaving aside the unlikely policy 
of armed neutrality," Turkey has three genuine options: pursuing the project 
of a Black Sea Cooperation Zone; the establishment of a Turkic 
commonwealth centred around Turkey and involving the former central 
Asian republics with significant Turkic populations; and stronger ties with 
the Arab countries of the Middle East through more extensive Turkish 
participation in the Islamic Conference Organization, and, perhaps, 
eventually through the creation of a Middle East common market. 
The security implications of all the three options are at best uncertain. 
The last of these would be an aggressively Islamic shift which is regarded 
as extremely undesirable in the EU, although the lukewarm reception of 
Turkish advances to the Arab world since the entry into government of the 
Welfare party makes this an unlikely scenario. However, whilst Turkey may 
well not abandon its European orientation, it may become a much more 
difficult partner for the EU. Consequently, the EU will have to tread 
carefully if it is to ensure that it does not pay a high price for 
accommodating the Greek Cypriots, in the shape of a highly detrimental 
effect on security in the south east Mediterranean and surrounding areas by 
alienating the Turks. Ultimately, the major implication of Cypriot accession 
to the Union may have little to do with Cyprus and rather more to do with 
the triangular relationship between Turkey, Greece and the rest of the 
European Union. 
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Malta's Neutrality and EU Membership 
In its opinion on Malta's membership of the European Union, the European 
Commission stated that, 'the Maltese Government's statement that it is in 
the country's interest to subscribe to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) does not alter the fact that it might be necessary to amend the 
Constitution if Malta is to participate fully in that policy as it develops over 
the next few years.'" The accession of three neutral states in the last 
enlargement brings to four the neutral club within the Union. The addition 
of Malta will increase the number to five. 
Neutrality has been described as an elastic concept because of the 
differing meanings which it has been given by states claiming to adhere to 
such a policy. Malta's definition of neutrality was inserted in the 
Constitution in 1987 and requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament to be 
amended." The former prime minister of Malta, Dr Eddie Fenech Adami 
has described the definition of neutrality as being sui generis. While 
addressing the WEU Assembly in June 1994, Guido de Marco, the former 
Maltese foreign minister, followed the same line taken by the EFTA neutrals 
prior to their EU membership, declaring that Malta's neutral status would 
not stand in the way of its full participation in the CFSP, which is Europe's 
declared finalites politiques.40 In April 1995 Malta joined NATO's 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) while a dialogue was started with the WEU in 
line with 'the development of links between Cyprus and Malta and the 
European Union'.'' In October 1996 Malta left the PfP, the first act of the 
new Labour government in office. However, the dialogue with the WEU 
may continue given that Malta intends seeking security guarantees with the 
EU. In the event of membership of the EU, Malta would probably join the 
WEU as an observer like the rest of Europe's neutrals. The participation of 
Europe's neutrals in the EU and WEU has been seen as making the merger 
of the two institutions even more difficult." 
The evolution of the concept of neutrality in the post-Cold War era is 
another factor which has important implications for Malta. Neutral states 
are finding it very hard to establish a role for themselves in a world free 
from the traditional antagonisms of the Cold War. Moreover, neutrality is 
seen as a serious obstacle in their participation in regional integration efforts 
both at the economic and political level. European neutrals cannot partake 
of the benefits of economic integration while at the same time maintain an 
aloofness from Europe's security structures. A further complication is that 
neutrality has not been defined in the same way by all states. Finland 
maintained a policy of neutrality because it shared a common frontier with 
the Soviet Union.'' Austria followed a policy of neutrality in the post-
Second World War period in return for the removal of Soviet occupation 
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forces from its territory. Switzerland's perpetual neutrality was guaranteed 
in international law in 1815 and traditionally goes back much further, but it 
is also capable of defending itself. Besides, during the Cold War, 
Switzerland lay well inside the perimeter of NATO's defence, so that the 
very deterrent which protected Western democracies also protected the 
Swiss." Much the same argument could be made for Sweden. 
At the multilateral level, the neutral states have also lost their 
importance. For example, in the CSCE, they had participated and 
coordinated their efforts as the 'Neutral and Non-Aligned' group and played 
an important mediating role between East and West. The end of the Cold 
War put an end to this role. European neutrals have therefore modified their 
concept of neutrality, limiting it only to the defence field but not in the area 
of foreign policy where they intend to continue to take a very active role, 
especially in peacekeeping efforts where they all enjoy extensive 
experience. This policy of dividing defence from foreign policy has also 
been made easier by European Union membership which provides them 
with an additional collective security dividend. Yet in the longer run, it is 
also likely that the divisions which have separated the defence, economic 
and foreign policy components of the EU's external action become more 
blurred in which case the European neutrals will either find it harder to 
integrate in all aspects of the CFSP or will have to modify further their own 
policies. 
It is in this general framework in which Malta's neutrality should be 
discussed. The backdrop of such a discussion of Malta's foreign policy and 
neutrality must be the change in government which occurred in 1987, which 
brought to an end the anti-western socialist administration of Dom Mintoff 
and his successor and ushered in the pro-western Christian Democratic 
government (Nationalist Party) of Edward Fenech Adami, committed to 
Malta's membership of the European Union. In the context of EU 
membership it was not only the European Commission which raised the 
issue of compatibility between neutrality and membership, but also the then 
opposition socialist party which opposed membership of the EU. The 
opposition declared the PfP membership to be contrary to the Maltese 
Constitution but stopped short of challenging the move in the courts. It has 
since been elected to power and has left the PfP. When in opposition the 
Labour Party proposed that a future Labour government, while keeping 
Malta out of the EU, would seek security guarantees from the Union'' Since 
the Union has not developed a defence arm yet, such an arrangement with 
the EU, if it came into effect, would either be void of essential meaning or 
would amount to a situation where the defence of Malta would be entrusted 
to the WEU, but relying on NATO. 
Malta's neutrality and security have come to depend solely on Italy. Past 
442 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 
attempts at diversification by enticing more countries to pledge guarantees 
have failed. Had they succeeded the efficiency of such guarantees would 
also have been in doubt as is amply clear by what happened to Cyprus 
whose territorial inviolability was also guaranteed by three powers. The 
other consideration is that although neutrality was inserted in the Maltese 
Constitution only in 1987, the definition given in the Constitution was the 
same as that obtaining in the 1980 Italo-Maltese neutrality agreement. 
Hence the 1987 amendment made constitutionally binding only what was 
accepted in practice in the period 1980--87. Far from following a passive 
foreign policy, in the period 1980--87, Malta signed two secret treaties with 
North Korea," and a Friendship Treaty with Libya in 1984, comprising a 
protocol on security committing both sides to a 'continuous exchange of 
information on matters of special interest to the mutual security and defense 
purposes of the other side' .47 
Lastly, the socialist administration had linked the definition of Maltese 
neutrality with non-alignment. The bill by which the constitutional 
amendments were proposed to Parliament included in its title that the aim 
was to include in the constitution 'the status of neutrality based on non-
alignment'. Whilst piloting the bill in Parliament in 1986, the Socialist 
Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, who had succeeded Dom 
Mintoff, elaborated the concept further: 'The policy and status of neutrality 
are qualified by the principles of non-alignment; they do not exist in a 
vacuum or in the abstract but it is specifically stated that the status of 
neutrality is based on the principle of non-alignment. And the principles of 
non-alignment are very simple because they refer to the two most powerful 
powers on earth, to America and Russia and the blocs that are bound to 
America and Russia. Therefore there can be no difficulty or doubts as to the 
true meaning of neutrality based on the principles of non-alignment.'" 
The end of the Cold War has also thrown the non-aligned movement into 
disarray, since it has removed the very basis of its existence. In the brand of 
socialism practised in Malta during the 1970s and 1980s, non-alignment 
was as much a domestic necessity as a foreign policy choice. Maltese 
leaders sought to use membership of the movement as a means to show their 
public that following the end of the British military bases in Malta they had 
not only become 'independent' but could also steer an independent course 
from the West. Similarly, non-alignment became a cover-up in their attempt 
to exploit superpower rivalries in order to obtain financial aid from the 
West. This was the ploy used in the neutrality agreement concluded with 
Italy which was also accompanied by a financial protocol providing 
financial aid to Malta. 
The uncertainties now surrounding the status of neutrality and non-
alignment described above, together with the unstable situation in the 
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Mediterranean region -especially the vulnerabilities derived from Malta's 
size and its strategic position - may well lead Malta to conclude that 
membership of the European Union provides its best guarantee of future 
security. From an EU perspective this increases the probability that Maltese 
accession to the Union will not cause problems for the development of the 
CFSP. 
Malta, Cyprus and the CFSP 
Thus far, the focus has been mainly on 'internal' (to Malta and Cyprus) 
aspects of the impact of further Mediterranean enlargement of the EU. 
However, whilst Malta and Cyprus clearly raise very specific matters, there 
are also 'external' issues- that is, the likely impact of their accession on the 
broader question of the development of the EU's CFSP and any future 
common defence policy. There are three fundamental strands to this issue. 
Firstly, there is the question of the worth of non-alignment and neutrality 
in a world which has moved on in such a way as to make them increasingly 
meaningless and devalued concepts. This has to be set against the clear 
benefits of EU membership, not only in terms of economic advantage but 
(less tangibly) political and arguably also security interests. The 
presumption has to be, perhaps more so in the Cypriot case, that any rational 
calculation would lead Malta and Cyprus to put aside their neutrality and 
non-alignment if it were to threaten the gains from EU accession. In any 
case, their current status has done little to prevent military intervention in 
Cyprus while, in the case of Malta, its security and neutrality are guaranteed 
by Italy which may pick and choose whether to use military force in case of 
serious violation of Malta's sovereignty. 
Secondly, the CFSP (and certainly the 'common defence policy' of the 
EU), as they currently stand, are so undeveloped as to be quite compatible 
with neutrality and non-alignment. The CFSP is very minimal and all the 
Treaty of European Union really does is to set out a number of broad 
objectives which are clearly acceptable to a group of essentially similar 
western democratic nations. Moreover, it is likely that policy will develop 
only very slowly and in relatively flexible ways. WEU is a particular 
problem. For example, it is far from clear how it can be absorbed by the EU 
as its 'defence arm' when the membership of the two organizations does not 
even overlap. 
This leads to the third and final point, Malta and Cyprus will not be 
alone- there are already four neutral states within the EU (Austria, Finland, 
Ireland and Sweden); and the case of Denmark which, in accordance with 
Section C of the decision adopted by the European Council in Edinburgh on 
I I -12 December 1992, does not participate in the elaboration and 
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implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications (without preventing the adaptation of such Council decisions). 
Consequently, Malta and Cyprus do not raise new issues in this respect. 
There are precedents to follow - observer status is already available for 
neutral countries where appropriate - and the EU will continue to take into 
account the position· of its neutral members as it develops its security and 
defence dimension. Indeed, the micro-state status of Malta and Cyprus 
means that it other the other four neutrals that comprise the much bigger 
problem. Thus whatever accommodations the existing EU neutral members 
negotiate will be offered to Malta and Cyprus. 
In the light of all this, it is difficult to see how Cyprus and Malta create 
a particular problem for the CFSP. It is even harder to imagine that the larger 
EU members will allow two small island states to prevent them pushing 
forward on the security front, even if this means some kind of flexibility in 
the EU or 'consensus minus two (or even six or seven)'. 
In fact, flexibility may well hold the key to the development of the 
CFSP. 'Variable geometry' is being widely discussed within the EU and 
may be ideal for the security sphere. In any case, it is probably true that it 
is not the accession of two small Mediterranean neutral/non-aligned 
countries but rather the accession of the formerly Soviet, central and eastern 
Europeans that creates the biggest dilemma for the CFSP and the WEU. 
Ultimately, the main contribution of Malta and Cyprus to the EU may come 
not from their status but from their geographical position: they will press for 
more focus on Mediterranean security issues in EU policy and their very 
membership will make this inevitable. 
Conclusion 
The central concern of this article has been the impact on the European 
Union of the accession of Cyprus and Malta and, more specifically, the 
security implications of this. When (and if) the two Mediterranean 
applicants eventually join the Union, it will almost certainly be in the 
company of some of the other nine or ten applicants from central and 
eastern Europe (and the timing of accessions may be phased). They will be 
joining a Europe which has taken increasingly northern and central 
European characteristics, a Europe which will view the world through the 
prism of the main concerns of central and eastern Europe, primarily the 
place of Germany and relations with Russia. The Mediterranean, already 
low in the Union's concerns, will even be lower in priority. It has not the 
object of this article to dwell on the dangers and challenges which the Union 
faces in the Mediterranean region. However, there is a broad consensus that 
these problems could destabilize Europe itself if left to run out of hand. 
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Malta and Cyprus, being wholly Mediterranean states whose prosperity 
depends to a large degree on the maintenance of stability in the region will, 
to the extent that they will be able to unmoor themselves from particular 
issues and move to more general and far reaching ones, partly redress the 
imbalance of focus in the enlarged European Union of over twenty 
members. 
The EU has already started refocusing on the Mediterranean region and 
on the problems with which everyone is familiar through the launching of 
the so-called Bum-Mediterranean Partnership. The partnership has been 
launched, but it is well short of being reality. It may stall as many other 
well-intended but ill-conceived initiatives in the Mediterranean region in 
the past such as the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the proposed Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region (CSCM), the 
Council of the Mediterranean, the Five + Five and the Mediterranean 
Forum. There is always the danger, on the EU side, that the member states 
on the Mediterranean littoral who, prima facie, might be expected to take 
the greatest interest in their region, might for one reason or other abdicate 
this responsibility. This is understandable considering that these member 
states - Spain, France, Italy, Greece and to an extent Portugal - have in a 
sense a double personality. For a long time in their contemporary history 
they have been more interested in affairs in central Europe than in what 
happens in the Mediterranean region. They have only periodically returned 
to the region in times of crisis (Suez, the war of independence in Algeria, 
successive Middle Eastern crises, and so on). Once the emergency passes, 
interest wanes. 
Or worse, they become embroiled in purely sub-regional affairs, in their 
'near abroad', neglecting the wider issues. Thus France and Spain have 
concentrated on developments in the Maghreb, Greece on its relations with 
Turkey, the Cyprus issue and recently the Balkans, whilst Italy, bedevilled 
by domestic instability, has had a minimum impact on the region. Cyprus 
and Malta, being at the farthest periphery of the European Union in the 
Mediterranean, have a stronger interest in region-wide developments- such 
as the rise of militant Islam, demographic changes, economic growth, 
migratory pressures and instability in general. They will be expected to 
bring these concerns to the attention of the Union, in so far as they 
themselves do not become bogged down by single 'national' issues such as 
the 'Cyprus problem' in the case of Cyprus, or some dispute on the 
delimitation of the territorial sea and the Continental shelve in the central 
Mediterranean in the case of Malta. (In fact, Malta has unsettled disputes of 
this kind with Libya, Italy and Tunisia.) 
The two Mediterranean applicant states have some common features of 
relevance to the discussion. Both are ex-colonies of Britain with relations to 
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the Commonwealth, an additional minor but not wholly insignificant 
element to the Union's external action, especially in its relations with 
developing countries. Both island states believe that they can serve as a 
bridge between the European Union and the Arab world. Cyprus has 
developed trading relations in the Mashrek while Malta has a trade surplus 
with Libya, which is also the source of its oil. It is important to note that 
both countries have engaged in peaceful transactions with their Arab 
neighbours and value this. The two prospective member states enjoy special 
ties with two other EU Mediterranean states -Malta with Italy by virtue of 
the neutrality guarantees and Cyprus with Greece by virtue of their joint 
defence alliance and common culture. 
Both have a direct stake in the maintenance of stability in the 
Mediterranean region. A serious conflict in the Mediterranean could 
damage their tourism industry on which their economic prosperity has 
grown. Gross earnings from tourism for Malta during 1994 amounted to 33 
per cent of manufactured output, while for Cyprus gross earnings from 
tourism amounted to 64 per cent of manufactured output. Cyprus suffered 
reductions in tourist arrivals and earnings as a result of the Gulf War. The 
effect on Malta was less marked because of geographic distance from the 
area of conflict. Both states are then expected to exercise caution on the use 
of military force in the region, both have a direct interest in the cause of 
general disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
in the Mediterranean. Because they risk higher stakes, and given their 
experiences in the non-aligned movement and neutrality in the case of 
Malta, not to mention their obvious military weakness, both will be 
expected to stand up for the peaceful settlement of disputes, preventive 
diplomacy and confidence-building measures. Both countries, being small, 
will work on a wider concept of security that is not limited to the traditional 
definition. 
As members of the European Union, both states are expected to support 
closely proposals for enhancing security and stability in the Mediterranean 
region. Malta's proposal for the setting up of the 'Council of the 
Mediterranean' may not be the right remedy for the region- in any case it 
has been overtaken by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership commenced in 
November 1995 - but it shows what importance the country attaches to 
dialogue rather than confrontation. Malta has now proposed a Stability Pact 
for the Mediterranean modelled on the Baladur initiative but possessing 
unique characteristics which take into consideration the specialities of the 
situation in the Mediterranean region. The idea was first put forward by 
Malta's then foreign minister, Guido de Marco, at the final conference on 
the Pact of Stability in Europe, held in Paris in March 1995." The issue was 
pursued within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiated by the 
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European Union at the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 and the 
Mediterranean Forum introduced by France and Egypt and involving a 
number of Mediterranean coastal states. The proposal for the Stability Pact 
for the Mediterranean region is based on eight principles: 
I. Refraining from the threat or use of force; 
2. Peaceful settlement of international disputes; 
3. Inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states; 
4. Right of peoples to self-determination and to live in peace on their own 
territory within internationally recognised and guaranteed frontiers; 
5. Sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in internal affairs; 
6. Respect for human rights; 
7. Co-operation between states; and 
8. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations assumed under international law. 
The initial proposal was defined in more detail in April 1996 in a 
communication from the Maltese foreign minister to the 27 countries which 
had participated in the Barcelona Conference.'" 
The two applicant states have a sense of vulnerability, being surrounded 
as they are by more powerful states. They are also the furthest southwards 
on the Union's stability frontier. Membership of the European Union is one 
of many ways by which they seek to enhance their security in a sea of 
turmoil. The overall EU military strength (taken as the sum of its individual 
member states since the EU does not encompass security) will not change 
by the addition of the two Mediterranean mini-states. Nor will the EU's or 
the individual member states' overall strategic position in the Mediterranean. 
Britain and through it NATO, already has military bases in Cyprus, while in 
the case of Malta it will certainly deny the installation of foreign military 
bases on its soil. However, the two island states may become crucial in the 
Union's efforts to contain the growing illegal migration and the narcotics 
trade. 
On membership, Malta and Cyprus will have to leave the non-aligned 
movement. This is something both countries have been willing to do. 
Meanwhile, the transformations which have occurred in the world have in 
fact devalued the importance of the movement which is searching for a 
raison d'etre. Whatever happens to the non-aligned movement, Cyprus and 
Malta will serve as interlocutors of the EU with it. 
As far as neutrality is concerned, this policy stance is not a feasible 
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project for either. Malta's peculiar neutrality has, as shown, not served as an 
obstacle to it joining NATO's Partnership for Peace, even though the latter 
is not an alliance nor a half-way house to it, but is largely confined to 
peaceful collaborative exercises. Cyprus and Malta will in all probability 
model their behaviour in the area of foreign and security policy on the 
behaviour of the neutral EU member states - Finland, Sweden, Ireland and 
Austria (and Denmark)- and, in as far as the policy stance of these changes, 
the policy stance of the Mediterranean applicants will be expected to change 
as well. To that extent, the accession of Malta and Cyprus to the EU should 
not create any 'new' difficulties for the development of the CFSP beyond 
those introduced by the 1995 enlargement. 
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